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The UCIPR confirms its political risk assessment of 6-7 points made by the ten-point scale in 
November 2008. 
 
The structure of political risks, characterized by insufficient guarantees of property rights, non-
transparent decision-making methods, corrupt relations and political instability, is retained. 
 
A major factor of political instability at the modern stage is the process of regrouping interests of 
groups of influence caused by the forthcoming presidential elections and freezing of structural 
reforms. The state of decision-making within the system of power can be characterized as 
“stability in underdevelopment”. 
 
There is a high possibility of transformation of a political regime in Ukraine. Political instability 
results from relations, under which a political system, a system of power, its acquisition and 
spread become the object of politics. Instability of the parliamentary coalition and a shift of 
decision-making centers from parliamentary to extra-parliamentary structures create conditions 
for the destabilization of Ukraine’s parliamentary business and low-predictable actions of 
possible political alliances. Political instability is linked to the practical revision of rules of the 
law in force actually meaning a denial to develop government policy documents that entrench 
fundamentals of the system of government and basic principles of national security. 
 
The protection of property rights still depends on a political situation. The upcoming 
presidential elections create preconditions for the redistribution of acquired property. 
 
Privatization will be non-transparent in the medium-term period because of the dominance of 
interests of influential economic agents in the political process that fight for control of resources 
and simultaneously strive to protect their interests and property from actions of competing 
groups. 
 
High risks attend the land property right. The moratorium on the sale of agricultural lands will 
not be abolished in the near future. This will entail the instable position of land owners and their 
continued dependence upon political fluctuations.  
 
The large capital learnt to conduct a dialogue with power, whereas the administrative and tax 
pressure on the medium and small business will increase (especially given the curtailment of 
business operations).  
 
No radical changes are expected in the taxation system. The number of taxes will be high and 
their administration will be time-consuming.  
 
Influences of groups of political interests outside Ukraine will retain and enhanced. Meanwhile, 
there is a possibility of the artificial escalation of inter-ethnic tensions, which will mean the 
spread of political instability on social relations. 
 
A short- and medium-term forecast of political stability is unfavorable. An intrigue of the 
political process in the context of the presidential elections is not whether political stability will 
come and whether political risks will reduce but how interests of economic agents in politics will 
be regrouped.  
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Politics: Consensus and Polarization of Political Elites 
 
 
A major factor of political instability at the modern stage is the process of regrouping 
interests of groups of influence caused by the forthcoming presidential elections.  
 
In the context of the expected great privatization, political elites act as purely economic 
agents fighting for control of resources. Interests are regrouped around either 
candidates viewed by groups of influence as objects of their support or opportunities to 
ensure economic interests of these groups at the stage before the presidential elections. 
The presidential elections and their date are important just as a point of measuring 
economic strategies of persons concerned. 
 
Multidirectional political processes are going on now. Political ties are instable and their 
rapid change under the difference between government documents and practical 
strategies of actors entail instability of the system of decisions making and low 
predictability of their content. Notwithstanding rather polarized politics, specific 
political alliances of powerful groups of influence are set up, which are used to attain 
status (power) goals.  
 
Erosion of the specific political competence area evidences actual interests of 
representatives of political forces that, despite leftist electoral tactics, are uniting in 
strategies for the coming and retention of power and the subordination of political 
decisions to interests of homogenous economic groups. Such solidarity is a form of 
consensus of political elites. Though, every time this will be a one-time consensus. Its 
subject is a scope of power interests of dominant groups. The high level of conflict 
political strategies and tactics is retained at a variety of levels of government 
institutions. 
 
The nature of the dominance of interests of capital in the decision-making system 
determines the further strengthening of relations, under which access to property and 
government institutions is viewed as a tool of profit earning. This circumstance evokes 
the absence of interest of dominant groups in reforming government institutions and in 
reforms that can change their status in the system of decision-making and, 
consequently, affect a profit earning model. Specifically, this concerns reforms linked to 
the organization of the system of government, its legitimization and administration 
procedure. According to experts on politics, some, including the administrative 
(administrative and territorial) (62.5%), local self-government (58%), system of 
government (54%), constitutional (75%) and social policy (55%) reforms, were not 
carried out because of the absence of unanimity of elite groups on their content; some 
others, including the judicial and legal (66.6%), electoral (62.5%), public finance 
administration (75%), deshadowing of the economy (54%), anti-corruption policy 
(62.5%) and agrarian reform together with the legally protected land market (45.8%) 
were not implemented because of unwillingness of elite groups since reform results will 
be contrary to the current status of these groups (see Appendix “Modeling the Future. 
From “New Faces in Politics” to “A New Face of Politics”). 
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Balances in a Political System.  
A Possible Transformation of a Political Regime  
 
There is a high possibility of transformation of a political regime in Ukraine as a result 
of the half-hearted political reform suggested while voting changes to the Constitution 
on 8 December, 2004. Constitutional changes in the organization of the system of 
government were unsystematic, while the issue of their illegitimacy due to the violation 
of procedures for amending the Constitution was removed by the fact of its 
incontestability in the Constitutional Court over 2005 because of its unformed 
composition and the entry of the issue into force in 2006.  
 
Nevertheless, despite the polycentric political system, there are risks of the 
redistribution of power in the interests of dominant groups. Irregular and incomplete 
changes occasionally tried by political conflicts inside power actualize issues of further 
reforms in the system of government through amending the current Constitution or 
even adopting a new one.  
 
The uniform constitutional process is not ensured. Different political forces suggest 
their own visions of the system of government. There is a possibility that parliament will 
be presented with draft constitutional changes expressing common interest of the 
constitutional majority of the Verkhovna Rada. At the same time, non-submission of 
such the bill by the end of the current session will mean the conservation of the 
constitutional process and its postponement for the period after the presidential 
elections. 
 
A rather high unpredictability of a political regime transformation at the current stage is 
caused by instability of the parliamentary coalition. Under the Constitution, the 
coalition shall be the one of a parliamentary majority but it does not suit this 
requirement in numerical terms as it is composed following a decision of a majority in 
factions (which is confirmed by the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 17 
September, 2008). As a result of the above, the coalition sometimes cannot play its role 
enshrined in the Constitution, law on the Cabinet of Ministers, Verkhovna Rada 
Regulations and coalition agreement. Specifically, the coalition cannot cope with 
personnel issues, which remain on the political agenda for long. In particular, two 
offices are vacant in the government over three months, the Minister of Finance that 
emerged after the resignation of Victor Pynzenyk on 17 February 2009 and the Foreign 
Minister that emerged after the resignation of Volodymyr Ogryzko on March 3, 2009. 
Public processes of nominating candidates for these offices and a discussion of their 
business qualifications and political platforms are absent, which creates additional risks 
for the decision-making system given the need to promote foreign political initiatives.  
 
Meanwhile, it is the coalition that is vested with exclusive powers to form the 
government trough submitting proposals to the President of Ukraine on its candidate 
for the Prime Minister and candidates for Cabinet ministers in compliance with both the 
Constitution of Ukraine and the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 28 April, 2009.  
 
Procedural mechanisms for decision coordination in parliament, such as the Coalition 
Council and the Parliamentary Coordinating Council, do not work properly.  
 
The coalition’s instability provokes uncertainties in politics and legislation. The PM 
faction not always votes for government bills. Specifically, on March 20, 2009, the bill 
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“On the Fair Conduct of Persons Responsible to Perform Government and Local Self-
Government Functions” was rejected because only two members of the BYuT faction 
voted for it.  
 
To conduct its position in parliament, the government has to seek understanding 
outside the coalition, which entails either one-time agreements or long-term pacts. Such 
short- and long-term deals are concluded outside documents regulating activities of the 
parliamentary coalition and are based on meeting interests and needs of members of 
backroom alliances.  
 
Regulation procedures in parliament need to be legally revised according to the 
judgment of the Constitutional Court of 1 April, 2008 since parliament has to settle 
organizational and procedural issue pertaining to activities of the Verkhovna Rada (and 
the status of MPs) exclusively by force of law. As of now, the status of regulations of the 
Verkhovna Rada of 19 September, 2008, which sets procedures for the preparation and 
holding of parliamentary sessions and meetings, formation of national authorities, the 
legislative procedure, procedures for consideration of other issues within the scope of its 
competence and controlling procedures for the Verkhovna Rada, is uncertain.  
 
Instability of the parliamentary coalition and a shift of decision-making centers from 
parliamentary to extra-parliamentary structures create conditions for the destabilization 
of Ukraine’s parliamentary business and low-predictable actions of possible political 
alliances.  
 
Specific features of political instability relations are linked to the practical revision of 
rules of the system of government actually meaning a denial to develop government 
policy documents that entrench other (actual) fundamentals of the system of 
government and basic principles of national security. Under the current procedure, 
government documents differ from the actual content of politics.  
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Compliance with Established Decision-Making Procedures in the 
Government and the Parliamentary Coalition.  
Transparent (Non-Transparent) Decision-Making  
 
Political stability is based on consistent decision-making as a guarantee of predictability 
of power decisions.  
 
Government and parliamentary decisions are not always predictable as they do not 
always comply with established procedures. The government can make decisions “by 
vote”, whereas the Cabinet Regulations and the law on the Cabinet provide for 
preliminary discussion of draft decisions in government committees.  
 
The practice of using the stamp “for employees only” by the Cabinet is unjustified and is 
not provided for by the law in force. In 2008, the Cabinet of Ministers repeatedly 
practiced this and, by doing so, endorsed 33 acts, inclusive of 17 resolutions and 16 
orders. Over less than 6 months of 2009, the government has passed 8 closed 
resolutions and 4 orders, which runs counter to its legislative commitments undertaken 
in the area of information circulation. Closed decisions of authorities and their 
leadership happen to provide for dubious, from the legal viewpoint, remuneration for 
them. In this regard, of special note is information on the content of the closed order of 
the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada adopted on June 7, 2006. The press informed (the 
order is absent in the electronic database of parliamentary decisions) it reads that after 
the termination of their powers, all Speakers of the Verkhovna Rada shall be provided 
with their personal offices in administrative buildings of parliament and service cars 
“for regular work” as well as the right to have a counselor and an aide. The practice of 
personal property guarantees for high officials confirms wide interest in getting offices 
within the system of power.  
 
Low predictability of power decisions is also determined by the strong dependence of an 
administrative element from political one. This risk might be eliminated by the 
administrative reform, which would divide the public service system and political 
processes on new principles. Yet, this reform is not expected in the medium-term 
period. Throughout the whole cadence of parliament of the 6th convocation (since 2007) 
and the government, neither a draft concept of the public administration reform nor 
bills on reforming activity of ministries and national authorities have been approved so 
that to enhance the quality of power decisions.  
 
The scope of power and its concentration on the national level remain high. For the time 
being, the matter does not concern power decentralization and deconcentration in the 
interests of strengthening local self-government and offering citizens opportunities to 
get services from authorities close to them and capable of this. 
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External Factors Influencing the Political Process in Ukraine  
 
 
Among other things, the high level of political instability in Ukraine is determined by 
influences and the alignment of forces on the international scene.  
 
Influential political actors have different views on Ukraine’s role in the security system 
caused by the degree of readiness to get the political support from different centers of 
influence. 
 
There are the European integration orientation, European Neighborhood Policy 
proposal, EU Eastern Partnership project and steps geared toward making Ukraine 
closer to the EU and adopting EU models of behavior of economic agents, in particular, 
the signing, by the end of 2009, of the free trade zone agreement between the EU and 
Ukraine, on the one hand and there are the foreign political interest of the Russian 
Federation mirrored in the Russian National Security Strategy until 2020 of May 12, 
2009, legitimation of the doctrine to protect its citizens by any means and influences of 
bearers and representatives of interests of the Russian state on Ukrainian politics on the 
other.  
 
The latter circumstance is manifested in the increase of proposals of political actors 
aimed at the actual revision of previous agreements on national security (e.g. positions 
of a new role of the RF Black Sea Fleet in the protection of Ukraine’s frontiers), which 
creates an atmosphere of unpredictable positions of the Ukrainian state on some issues 
of the collective security architecture and a lack of understanding of the weight of 
mandates of subjects, who voice proposals on behalf of the state. 
 
Russia retains positions to include the former USSR countries into the area of its 
influence and intends to enhance this influence if some active political actors are ready 
to realize it in Ukraine.  
 
An EU closer integration policy towards Ukraine is hampered by not only EU internal 
circumstances, as it may seem, but also insufficient concentration of the Ukrainian state 
on the commitment to carry out internal system reforms and the compliance with 
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The Property Right and Guarantees of Its Protection  
 
The strong dependence of property right guarantees on a political situation poses a 
major source of property risks. The private property is formally recognized. Though, the 
practice proves there are risks linked to the seizure of property and not only following 
legal procedures provided for by the Constitution of Ukraine. 
 
A) Regulatory Policy 
 
In this aspect, of special note is the bill “On the Prohibition of Gambling” passed by 
parliament on May 15, 2009 that reads, “Gambling and gaming is completely prohibited 
in Ukraine.” Nine people killed in a fire in a gambling hall in Dnipropetrovsk drew 
public attention to the issue. Under the document, it enters into force 3 days after its 
publication. “From the date of its enactment onwards, licensing of all activities related 
to gambling in Ukraine shall be cancelled and licenses issued to economic entities before 
the date of enactment of this law shall be annulled.”  
 
On May 14, the bill was included into the agenda of the Verkhovna Rada and on May 15, 
it was approved following the simplified procedure bypassing preliminary public 
discussion mechanisms. Earlier on, on May 7, the Cabinet issued the order to suspend 
licenses of all gambling institutions for one month.  
 
The prohibition of one of industries unexpected for business subjects does not remove 
the need for its government control. Rules of the law are not administrative in nature 
alone, its adoption drastically changes terms and conditions for the conduct of business 
in this area. This decision does not aim to eliminate the negative social effect (in 
particular, the gambling addiction) from a lack of regulation of the gambling industry 
because it creates preconditions for its shadowing with all ensuing consequences and 
does not provide for mechanisms for the reparation of damages.  
 
Meanwhile, the bill “On the Government Regulation of Gambling” that suggests 
approaches to the regulation of gambling was approved as a basis in parliament on 26 
December, 2008.  
 
The postponement of making draft decisions and the disregard of terms of their 
consideration create grounds for the approval of populist decisions, which fail either to 
solve problems or to link government policy to the regulation of social phenomena at the 
phase of their emergence but give rise to a drastic change of conditions for business 
operations.  
 
Today, the Ukrainian state is able to guarantee owners neither the retention of property 
rights nor their judicial protection nor recovery of investment. Loyalty of property 
owners to the country’s political leadership or their direct involvement in decision-
making groups at a variety of levels are the only guarantees.  
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B) Land Issue  
 
The land is almost the only property, a considerable part of which still lies outside the 
legal market. The moratorium on the sale of agricultural lands results in the fact that 
despite the official recognition of the private property in land by the government, it still 
remains a commodity circulated by shadow schemes.  
 
Analysis of the structure of risks linked to the property in land evidences they are mostly 
concentrated in the legislation impacted by the largest land owners disinterested in the 
land market regulation. The moratorium on the sale of agricultural lands poses a main 
obstacle on the path to a civilized land market. Its constant prolongation only proves the 
absence of an intention to legally ensure the functioning of the land market.  
 
The Land Code of Ukraine (LCU), by which the Verkhovna Rada constantly prolongs the 
moratorium on the sale of agricultural lands, provides that this moratorium shall be 
removed under the entry into force of the laws on the state land cadastre and on the 
land market. The government works in this direction but the LCU in force gives grounds 
for “manual” control of the situation on abolishing the moratorium, which under the 
given circumstance may be viewed as a means of extension of the status quo.  
 
Groups disinterested to shift to a legal land market dominate in parliament. A new 
President of Ukraine (even a liberal politician) will have to reckon with such the 
alignment of forces (the same stands true about other issues of the regulation of 
different business spheres). Most likely, the land issue will remain a “small coin” in 
bargaining of political forces and a means of mobilizing voters for the upcoming 
presidential and parliamentary campaigns. Even given the passage of necessary laws, 
the moratorium on the sale of agricultural lands will not be removed in the near future. 
It means investment in land (in both small land plots for the individual use and large 
areas for the construction and others) is very risky.  
 
Manipulations with lands gave rise to the spread of corruption. A rather narrow circle of 
persons concerned (including representatives of nearly all political forces), who have 
great advantages from their beneficial positions (including privileges and subsidies, 
which agrarian lobbyists annually “wrest” from the budget) got access to land resources. 
These groups are naturally not interested in either the increase of their number or the 
reduction of budget receipts. The availability of the above circle of land owners 
integrated into the political class and administrative elite impedes investment in land.  
 
Certain social risks stimulated by the market are linked to the transformation of land 
into a full-fledged commodity. The financial and investment capital (banking 
institutions, trade and real estate actors) interested to make the land a full-fledged 
commodity supports the removal of the moratorium. This would enable them not only 
to make advantageous investment but also to control the land business. Though, there is 
a danger that banking institutions will take possession of all large land plots if the 
mortgage land becomes the property of the mortgagee. Also there is a risk that financial 
profiteers will purchase lands and resell them for big money, which will affect the cost of 
agrarian produce and cause inflation. In the long run, there are apprehensions that “all 
lands will be purchased by oligarchs and foreigners”, whereas the peasants will lose 
their plots.  
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Such apprehensions once again confirm land risks closely relate to the legislative 
business of parliament. The accurate and painstaking work of law-makers, who must 
provide for all possible consequences of the land market’s creation, shall precede the 
removal of the moratorium. Specifically, to restrict the purchase of land by banks, it is 
expedient to oblige them to sell lands of mortgagers acquired as a result of outstanding 
payments or mortgage tenders within a certain period.  
 
To avoid speculations on the land market, many economies that profit from the rapid 
market circulation of lands apply the principle of higher taxation for the short-term 
ownership and, conversely, practice low-interest income taxes for the long-term 
ownership. As for non-residents, it is expedient to discuss mechanisms for control of the 
use of lands. As far as the loss of lands by the peasants is concerned, only a profit-
making agrarian business could help them to effectively exercise their right in land 
instead of trying to sell it even for nothing.  
 
With regard to risks attending the land issue, it is predicated to remain unsettled in the 
near future. And the moratorium’s removal alone will solve nothing. The land market 
creates conditions that stimulate the effective use of land and make some entities deny a 
part of land, if it does not function properly. Yet, the very land market is not a guarantor 
of economic stability. The government is obliged to create conditions for the protection 
of land property rights, compliance of entities with their contractual obligations, the 
purpose and reasonable use of the country’s land supply. And government policy must 
be built on combination of interests of economic entities of the agricultural sector.  
 
The adoption of laws, which will deprive investors of lands or put them in such 
conditions that they will be made deny land plots, cannot be ruled out. Given 
parliamentary inaction, investors are forced to resolve their problems with local 
authorities by means of corruption and through “grey” schemes. The peasants are 
actually losing lands. The situation is advantageous only for a relatively small group of 
land owners capable of lobbying their interests at the highest level.  
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C) Property Privatization  
 
Methods of privatization (in the broad sense of the term) enabled the Soviet 
nomenclature to reproduce itself on a new basis. Due to non-transparent privatization, 
property relations in Ukraine are distorted to a large extent and are still regulated rather 
by informal backroom accords and the selective application of the law in force than by 
market mechanisms and rules of the law.  
 
The largest privatization risks are evoked rather by the arbitrary rule of applying the 
property legislation than by its deficiencies. The selective approach to privatization and 
nationalization of some political forces is evident. There are expectations to acquire 
property due to its redistribution. This is evidenced by events around the Nikopol 
Ferroalloy Factory and the tender on selling the Luhanskteplovoz. In the first instance, 
the government made pressure on a factory owner intending to transfer ownership of 
the NFF to others. In the second case, the State Property Fund (SPF) set tender 
conditions so that they proved to be favorable for one of claimants.  
 
Despite that Article 41 of the Ukrainian Constitution reads, “No one shall be unlawfully 
deprived of the right of property. The right of private property is inviolable… 
Confiscation of property may be applied only pursuant to a court decision, in the cases, 
in the extent and by the procedure established by law”, the SPF drafted the bill “On 
Amending Some Legislative Acts on Privatization Issues” (concerning the responsibility 
of buyers of privatization objects). Under the bill, Paragraph 9, Article 27 of the law on 
privatization of state-owned property shall be amended as follows, “In case of non-
execution or improper execution of terms set by the purchase and sale contract, national 
privatization bodies have the right to denunciate it unilaterally. If so, the contract is 
denunciated since the moment the national privatization body notifies the buyer about 
the contract denunciation and the privatization object, including the land plot, shall be 
returned to state-owned property according to terms and procedures established by the 
purchase and sale contract.” The formulation “in case of non-execution or improper 
execution of terms by the buyer” is too vague and gives the SPF the right to 
independently and rather arbitrarily decide as to whether the investor violated the 
contract terms. The deletion from Paragraph 9, Article 27 of the rule reading that the 
contract shall be denunciated following a court decision also runs counter to Paragraph 
5, Article 27 (“the purchase and sale contract shall be denunciated following a court 
decision”) and Article 651 of the Civil Code of Ukraine (“the contract may be amended or 
cancelled either by parties agreement or following a court decision”).  
 
The adoption of the bill proposed by the SPF will apparently allow controlling re-
privatization “manually”, which will cast doubt on the property right in any privatized 
object. 
 
Interests of large financial and industrial groups are integrated in the system of power 
reproduced from elections to elections and, hence, these groups remain dominant in the 
decision-making system. At the same time, they get more advantages from the creation 
of conditions for their business in a backroom manner.  
 
Privatization of the state-owned property should be a cornerstone of socio-economic 
reforms in Ukraine. Yet, privatization is often viewed in the context of purely fiscal 
measures, while the inconsistency and non-transparency of privatization processes 
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(especially, the transfer of property) create preconditions for political confrontation, 
which deteriorates the socio-economic situation in the country. 
 
Privatization in Ukraine needs a government strategy for reforming property relations, 
consideration of inter-branch ties in the economy, institutional mechanisms for the 
market regulation, transparent decision-making on privatization of strategic enterprises 
and business monopolies. This would essentially enhance investment attractiveness of 
the national economy. 
 
However, privatization processes will be non-transparent in the medium-term period. 
The sale of a certain strategic unit will be motivated mostly by the need to increase the 
budget. There will be permanent deficit of receipts from privatization of the state-owned 
property with regard to the very unfavorable investment situation in the world. Hence, 
temptations to launch the resale of a certain object through re-privatization could be 
expected.  
 
There are expectations that the re-privatization issue may emerge at the presidential 
elections as at this time, attention of key political actors will traditionally be focused on 
the possible property redistribution and means to protect their personal interests 
against a new (renewed) team. Given the business slowdown, the revision of 
privatization results may be a basic motto of populist politicians’ campaigns. 
 
The participation of large world actors in privatization is possible thought it has to 
consider specific features of decision-making and administration in Ukraine.  
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Conditions for the Conduct of Business  
 
 
The large capital integrated to the government political and administrative elites can 
feel relatively at ease. The medium and small business is a hostage of politics and socio-
economic populism. The tax system reform aimed to se transparent, clear and equal 
rules of the game slowed down once and for all.  
 
A) Large Capital  
 
The large capital in Ukraine historically has to look for a consensus not with the 
employee and the public but with the government represented by the bureaucracy 
machinery and politicians. The search of such consensus is especially apparent while 
compiling election lists and making preparations for the presidential elections. Under 
the Ukrainian scheme of power-business relations, it is obviously more advantageous 
for the large capital to invest in the government, which using its monopolistic right, sets 
the amount of salaries inadequate to the employee’s contributions and tariffs on services 
that are not practically rendered.  
 
In its turn, the government intends to support relations with the large business by 
corruption means. Export-oriented enterprises are granted preferences in exchange for 
political loyalty of the large capital to the government.  
 
Legislative, business and socio-economic risks are closely intertwined in the practice of 
conduct of the large capital. This knot will actually be impossible to undo in the short-
term period. The dominance of representatives of the large capital in lead political 
forces in parliament makes MPs lobby mostly interests of this business level. 
Threatened by the curtailment of economic activity by owners of the largest businesses 
and the reduction of budget receipts, the government and parliament are forced to make 
various compromises (the grant of privileges, signing of memoranda etc.), which not 
only fail to create the necessary prerequisites for structural reforms but also impede this 
process.  
 
Over recently, the large capital has built relations with main political actors, trying to 
protect itself from consequences of political reshuffles. And, to some extent, it 
succeeded. Though, stability that should result from agreements of businessmen and 
politicians provides rather for the maintenance of the status-quo than for the 
development according to EU standards.  
 
The large business suffers serious losses because of the unfavorable situation on world 
raw materials markets. Despite a several-year growth, directors and owners of 
metallurgical, chemical and other export-oriented businesses have never managed to 
technically update them. So, the drop in demand for the Ukrainian exports seriously hit 
pockets of enterprise owners and even more it hit the wellbeing of employees and cast 
doubt on opportunities of the large capital to perform its social role. Needless to say, 
social and environmental programs were the first victims of the decrease in investment.  
 
In view of party platforms and principles of activity, it is possible to assume that 
attention of key political forces and presidential candidates will be further focused on 
problems of the large capital. This will mean the support to large businesses, lobbying of 
various privileges and special terms for their development.  
UCIPR, Politics Division  
Expert survey on politics issues, March 2009 




B) Medium and Small Business  
 
There are preconditions for the curtailment of activities of medium and small businesses 
oriented to meet the simplest and, thereby, mass needs of Ukrainians. The internal 
consumer market will curtail as well. Given the situation, efforts of the government to 
improve its programs for promoting the small and medium business seem to be nothing 
but a delay of a real solution of the problem. As is known, free competition within clear 
market rules is the most important condition for the business development.  
 
The main goal today is to create necessary conditions for independent economic activity 
of everyone. In this aspect, the government support cannot boil down to different 
sporadic and irregular actions for the so-called entrepreneurship support. The 
government must set simple and clear for all rules of the game, which would make 
people, who venture to carry out private business, sure of its stability and security. 
Conversely, we witness a mixture of populist measures and PR-actions targeted to 
mobilize voters in support of some political forces.  
 
The issue of the exercise of the entrepreneurship right closely relates to the reduction of 
tax burden on the small and medium business. However, this pressure was not eased 
but even grew stronger after a one-and-a-half-year alleviation. The acting Cabinet was in 
the situation of a substantial decrease of budget receipts due to the crisis and therefore 
decided this business segment will be a major source of earnings.  
 
Entrepreneurs are under the double pressure: on the part of national and local 
authorities. They cannot freely plan business operations, they do not know when and 
how much and, the main thing, what for they have to pay the state or some officials. All 
the time they risk losing their business and, thus, are forced to live one day. The practice 
of the acting government proves pressure on the small entrepreneur will increase 
(especially given the curtailed business), which will trigger negative social 
consequences.  
 
C) Tax System  
 
The tax policy is a main component of a country’s socio-economic development. Efforts 
to reform Ukraine’s tax system are permanent but tangible changes are made just in 
some directions. Taxes have not become an economic stimulation tool. The matter 
rather concerns the need to minimize negative impact of the tax system on activity of 
economic entities, which may serve, to some extent, as an incentive to the growth of 
entrepreneurship. Yet, such approach does not suit populist statements about higher 
social security payments.  
 
One of the major challenges of Ukraine’s tax system are tax privileges that not always 
meet innovation and investment goals, for which they were applied, but turned into a 
sinecure for close to power businesses. Another problem is the large number of taxes 
and related expenses for their administration. This also promotes corruption.  
 
The discussion around ways for the further improvement of the tax system of Ukraine is 
targeted to determine its structural principles and the ultimate goal of the work on 
improving taxation is the adoption of the Tax Code. As a matter of fact, all 
propagandistic endeavors of politicians are focused on the need to approve a new Tax 
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Code. Nevertheless, the Code is not a self-sufficient document but rather a core of the 
tax system and, therefore, has to crown the legislative drafting.  
 
Over these years of debates on ways for reforming the tax system, the economic elite and 
businessmen developed an understanding of deficiency of the law “On the Enterprise 
Income Tax”, the criminal nature of the valid VAT, excessive and too complicated 
administration of pension charges on the wage fund, a need for the single social tax and 
the pension reform, a need for taxes on wealth (real estate, property etc.), the vicious 
nature of privileges and preferences. The content of recent decisions does not live up 
expectations of an easier tax burden and simplified taxation.  
 
The complexity of Ukraine’s tax system is still a high barrier on the path to the business 
development in the country. Notwithstanding less time for tax payment due to the 
introduction of the electronic system of tax accounts, Ukrainian enterprises have to 
spend for this over 800 hours per annum. Ukrainian companies have to pay almost 100 
different taxes. The tax law, which is out of the political agenda for almost two years, 
needs to be reformed.  
 
A possibility of the tax reform in the medium-term period is minor as political forces 
that might take part in the formation of a governmental coalition have different 
approaches to ways for changing the tax law. Taking into account the upcoming 
presidential elections, the tax system reform remains a subject of discussion and 
speculations on the part of political forces that back up their candidates. 
UCIPR, Politics Division  
Expert survey on politics issues, March 2009 
From “New Faces in Politics” to “A New Face of Politics” 
 
16
Standards of Politics and Genesis of Political Elites  
 
In the context of potential retention of sources of risks in the medium-term period, one 
should be guided by assessment of a possible transformation of relations in politics. The 
context of political technologies makes their consumers expect new political elites in 
connection with the presidential elections (2010): a victory of a “new face” means 
desired transformations.  
 
To clarify credibility of the afore-mentioned, the UCIPR surveyed experts on politics 
(see Appendix “Modeling the Future. From “New Faces in Politics” to “A New Face of 
Politics”). According to the poll data, only 5% of experts pointed out a possibility of a 
drastic rapid change of political elites and the dominance of their new types in Ukraine 
as a result of the presidential elections. The majority (56%) of respondents are 
convinced new political elites in Ukraine will result from the evolutionary renewal. In 
the time dimension, the restricting of dominant types of power elites will be gradual 
(from the dominance of representatives and exponents of interests of the large capital 
and neo-patrimonial groups to representatives of groups that are not directly linked to 
such representation and are interested in reforms).  
 
The formation of new political groups may be caused by an understanding, by social 
groups, of their values, economic and political strategies, positions and their expression 
through mechanisms of extra-/inter-election involvement. New elites will come to the 
political forefront when new social groups become not “consumers” but “customers” of 
politics, and only in the case of its orientation towards systematic reforms.  
 
Irrespective of who will win the presidential elections, they will facilitate the formation 
of areas of political competence of each of the existing group of influence. The matter 
actually concerns the expression and strengthening of a clearer and more unbiased 
political identity of elite groups disguised under electoral tactics.  
 
A result of the presidential elections will finalize the continued process of regrouping of 
existent groups of interests. Their configuration will depend on political aims of the 
winner: either to “subordinate” dominant elite groups or to service their interests. 
Political activity of Ukrainian parliament in terms of its legislative content will be a 
consequence of a new configuration.  
 
In the broad sense, experts link the formation of new groups of interest in politics to 
new standards of political activity and the need for systematic reforms. 92% of 
respondents believe there is an opportunity to carry out reforms in the interests of the 
general public.  
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Assessment of decision-making procedures and analysis of positions of active economic 
agents in the system of political representation (the political decision-making process) 
allows assessing the degree of political risks in Ukraine at the level of 6-7 points.  
 
 
7 – Unpredictability is high.  
Regional instability, inclusion of the country into the zone of conflict of interests, 
polarized politics, high level of the “human factor” in decision-making, instable political 
ties, voluntarism in decision-making, closed decision-making in the interests of 
decision-making parties, disregard of procedures and the need for their recognition, 
unpredictable decisions, interference of the government with corporations and high 
level of corruption. 
 
 
6 – Unpredictability is higher than average.  
Polarized politics, high level of the “human factor” in decision-making, voluntarism in 
decision-making, closed decision-making in the interests of decision-making parties, 
disregard of procedures and the need for their recognition, unpredictable decisions, 
interference of the government with corporations and high level of corruption. 
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Political Stability Forecast for the  
Short- (May-August 2009) and  
Medium-Term (September-December 2009) Periods 
 
 
Until the beginning of the fall political season the following major tendencies will 
retain their influence in politics: 
 
- Shift of decision-making centers to extra-parliamentary structures will destabilize 
activity of parliament as the legislature  
 
- Start of the official presidential campaign will be a factor of growing competition 
between groups, decrease of activities on decision making and development and will 
provoke both uncertain decisions and the very fact of their approval  
 
- Vague constitutional process will entail an uncertain essence and directions of reforms 
on optimizing activities of political institutions and national authorities – 
administrative, local self-government, judicial and other bodies  
 
- Dominance of standards of shadow policy and shadow decision-making  
 
- Lack of consideration of interests of different groups concerned by decision-making 
authorities  
 
- Disinterest of the majority of political elites in reforms. Some reforms, including the 
administrative (administrative and territorial), local self-government, system of 
government, constitutional and social policy ones, were not carried out because of the 
absence of unanimity of elite groups on their content; some others, including the 
judicial and legal, electoral, public finance administration, deshadowing of the economy, 
anti-corruption policy and agrarian reform together with the legally protected land 
market were not implemented because of unwillingness of elite groups since reform 
results will be contrary to the current status of these groups  
 
- Absence of transparency in privatization of the state-owned property. In the medium-
term period, the sale of a certain strategic unit will be motivated mostly by the need to 
increase the budget. There will be permanent deficit of receipts from privatization of the 
state-owned property with regard to the very unfavorable investment situation in the 
world. Hence, temptations to revise the status of privatized objects could be expected  
 
- Frozen land issue. The moratorium’s removal alone will solve nothing. The land 
market creates conditions that stimulate the effective use of land and make some 
entities deny a part of land, if it does not function properly. Yet, the very land market is 
not a guarantor of economic stability. The government is obliged to create conditions for 
the protection of land property rights, compliance of entities with their contractual 
obligations, purpose and reasonable use of the country’s land supply. And government 
policy must combine interests of all economic entities of the agricultural sector. Now, it 
is possible to expect the adoption of laws, which will deprive investors of lands or put 
them in such conditions that they will be made deny land plots, cannot be ruled out. 
Given parliamentary inaction, investors are forced to resolve their problems with local 
authorities by means of corruption and through “grey” schemes. The peasants are 
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actually losing lands. The situation is advantageous only for a relatively small group of 
land owners capable of lobbying their interests at the highest level  
 
- Readiness of authorities to unofficially seek a compromise with representatives of the 
influential business. It is possible to assume that attention of key political forces and 
presidential candidates will be further focused on problems of the large capital. This will 
mean the support to large businesses, lobbying of various privileges and special terms 
for their development at the expense of stronger pressure on the medium and small 
business  
 
- Complexity of Ukraine’s tax system is still a high barrier on the path to the business 
development in the country. It is necessary to raise the issue of the tax reform. Taking 
into account different approaches of political forces to ways for changing the tax law, the 
tax reform will be carried out gradually and inconsistently 
 
The state of decision-making within the system of power can be characterized as 
“stability in underdevelopment”. Meanwhile, there is a possibility of the artificial 
escalation of inter-ethnic tensions, which will mean the spread of political instability on 
social relations. 
 
These tendencies are expected to retain their impact in the medium-term 
period – until the presidential campaign is over. 
 
In the future, the number of political risks might reduce due to the emergence of agents 
of interests of social groups interested in reforms, which will help divide an 
administrative element of government from political one and balance the decision-
making system in the interests of a wider circle of social groups. Aggregation of the 
above interests must precede their understanding and expression, development of 
effective social networks, lobbying of interests and strengthening of positions within the 
system of decision-making.  
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INFORMATION ABOUT THE UCIPR PROJECT ON  
POLITICAL RISK ASSESSMENT IN UKRAINE  
 
 
In 2008, having many-year experience of analysis of political processes and activity of political 
system institutions, the Ukrainian Center for Political Research launched a new project linked to 
the identification of factors of political risks in Ukraine. 
 
In the context of goals of this project, a political risk means tendencies that provoke uncertainty 
in the process of political and governmental decision-making and impede planning of actions on 
the country’s markets. Political risks grow from political relations, i.e. relation concerning power 
and property, lie in the area of political decision-making and influence positions of agents in 
other areas. The term “political risk” does not coincide, by its volume, with the term “political 
stability” and concerns action/inaction of the government that rapidly changes conditions of 
work of economic agents on markets and adversely affects positions of different social groups. 
Political instability is viewed as an element of the structure of political risks.  
 
The project objective: to forecast, on a basis of political risk assessment in Ukraine, a probability 
of the retention of their impact in the short- and medium-term period.  
 
The subject: to evaluate the placing and correlation of groups of political influence both inside 
and outside the country and to analyze positions of groups of influence. 
 
The methodology: expert polling (questionnaire poll) concerning assessment of impact of the 
determined factors, monitoring of decisions and draft decisions of national authorities in Ukraine 
and abroad (that relate to Ukraine), monitoring of decision-making procedures and assessment of 
positions of groups of influence.  
 
Assessments are regularly revised. 
 
The project is implemented by the UCIPR Politics Division.  
Division Head – Svitlana Kononchuk; Project Expert – Ihor Nemchynov, Candidate of 
Philosophy. 
Expert survey – Svitlana Gorobchyshyna. 
